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Abstract In this paper, we study individual incentives to report preferences
truthfully for the special case when individuals have dichotomous preferences on
the set of alternatives and preferences are aggregated in form of scoring rules. In par-
ticular, we show that (a) the Borda Count coincides with Approval Voting, (b) the
Borda Count is the only strategy-proof scoring rule, and (c) if the size of the electorate
is greater than three, then the dichotomous preference domain is the unique maximal
rich domain under which the Borda Count is strategy-proof.
1 Introduction
We analyze the aggregation of preferences in form of positional voting methods or
scoring rules (see, Smith 1973; Young 1975, among others) when individuals have
dichotomous preferences on the set of alternatives (every alternative belongs either to
the set of good or to the set of bad alternatives; an alternative is good if it is weakly
preferred to all other alternatives and it is bad if any arbitrary alternative is weakly
preferred to it). In particular, we are interested in strategy-proof scoring rules; that is,
we look for social choice functions belonging to the class of scoring rules that give
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individuals incentives to report preferences truthfully. Our main results establish that
on this domain restriction, the Borda Count (see, Borda 1781; Young 1974) is equal to
Approval Voting (see, Brams and Fishburn 1978) and the only strategy-proof scoring
rule.
In a series of papers, Saari and van Newenhizen (1988a, b) and Brams et al. (1988)
discuss advantages and disadvantages of Approval Voting versus scoring rules in gen-
eral and the Borda Count in particular. The former authors argue that Approval Voting
is highly indeterminate for a lot of preference profiles (many different outcome can
occur given a preference profile) and suggest the Borda Count as an alternative to the
widely established Plurality Rule. But this indeterminacy of Approval Voting is rather
a virtue according to the latter authors, because it eliminates incentives not to vote
sincerely whereas scoring rules are considered to be very manipulable (see, Dummett
1998; Saari 1990; Smith 1999).
One way how to contribute to this discussion is to compare scoring rules with
Approval Voting for different preference domains. But this task is not a straightfor-
ward one, because the aggregation procedures work quite differently. While scoring
rules are social choice functions and thus take into account the whole preference struc-
ture, Approval Voting is a voting rule that endows individuals with the right to vote
for as many alternatives as they wish to and selects all alternatives with the largest
support. Therefore, the level of information available about individual preferences is
generally lower under Approval Voting. This problem disappears when preferences
are restricted to be dichotomous, because if we interpret voting decisions as the set
of good alternatives, then individual preferences are fully revealed; that is, Approval
Voting becomes a social choice function. Since this is not true any more for richer
preference domains, the dichotomous preference domain constitutes is ideally suited
for comparing scoring rules with Approval Voting.
Scoring rules are typically applied on strict preference domains, but if they are
generalized to weak preferences in natural way, then the Borda Count is an affine
transformation of Approval Voting on the domain of dichotomous preferences
(Proposition 1). Since Brams and Fishburn (1978) have shown that Approval Voting
is equal to the Condorcet Rule (de Condorcet 1989) on this domain (remember that
according to (Inada 1964) the set of Condorcet winners is non-empty on dichotomous
preferences), the criticism on the Borda Count not to select an existing Condorcet win-
ner is only true if preferences consist of at least three indifference classes. An intuitive
way to appreciate of these conclusions is to recognize that by dividing the space into
the two categories of good and bad alternatives, each voter’s view of the alternatives
loosely resembles what happens when there are only two alternatives. As this classic
two-alternative setting is strategy-proof and always has a Condorcet winner, we must
anticipate these Approval Voting conclusions.
One common way to eliminate individual incentives to behave strategically is to
implement strategy-proof social choice functions. Brams and Fishburn (1978) have
shown that Approval Voting is strategy-proof on the dichotomous preference domain
and, therefore, one may wonder whether other scoring rules share the same property.
Proposition 2 gives a negative answer to this question if there are at least three voters,
and therefore, the Borda Count is the best scoring rule in terms of individual incentives
given the domain restriction.
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Finally, we deal with the question whether the underlying preference domain can be
enlarged without losing strategy-proofness for the Borda Count. Barbie et al. (2006)
study strategy-proof domains for the Borda Count under the assumptions that indi-
vidual preferences are strict and ties are broken in a non-neutral way. They find that
the Borda Count is non-manipulable on all domains which contain one fixed pref-
erence relation and all its cyclic permutation. Since these domains are rather small,
their result confirms the common opinion that scoring rules are highly manipulable.
Proposition 3 points into the same direction, because the dichotomous preference
domain is the largest domain for which the Borda Count is strategy-proof whenever
the size of the electorate is larger than three.
We proceed as follows. Next, we introduce notation and some basic definitions.
Afterwards, we present our results. In a final section, we justify the way we define
scoring rules for weak preferences by means of an axiomatic analysis.
2 Notation and definitions
Consider a group of individuals N = {1, ..., n} with preferences on the set of alterna-
tives K . The cardinalities of the two sets are finite and equal to n ≥ 2 and k ≥ 3. We
assume that k ≥ 3, because otherwise all scoring rules are equal to the Borda Count as
it will become clear from the definitions later on. Elements of K are usually denoted
by x , y and z.
Let Ri be the weak preference relation of individual i on K . We assume that Ri is
reflexive, complete, and transitive. The strict and the indifference preference relations
associated with Ri are denoted by Pi and Ii , respectively. The set of all weak prefer-
ence relations on K is denoted by R. A domain R¯ is a subset of R. Given a domain
R¯ ⊆ R, a preference profile R = (R1, ..., Rn) ∈ R¯N is an n-tuple of individual pref-




is obtained by changing
the preference relation of individual i at profile R from Ri to R′i ∈ R¯.
Given the preference relation Ri ∈ R¯, an alternative is good (bad) for individ-
ual i if it is weakly preferred to any other alternative (if any arbitrary alternative is
weakly preferred to it). Formally, define the set of good alternatives associated with
Ri as G(Ri ) = {x ∈ K : x Ri y for all y ∈ K }. Similarly, let B(Ri ) = {x ∈ K :
y Ri x for all y ∈ K } be the set of bad alternatives corresponding to Ri . The cardinal-
ities of these sets are equal to g(Ri ) and b(Ri ). The preference relation Ri ∈ R¯ is
then said to be dichotomous if and only if every alternative belongs to at least one of
these two sets: that is, if and only if G(Ri ) ∪ B(Ri ) = K . The domain of all dichot-
omous preferences is denoted by D ⊂ R and Di ∈ D is a particular dichotomous
preference relation for individual i . Finally, given the dichotomous preference profile
D = (D1, ..., Dn) ∈ DN , let I (D) = {i ∈ N : G(Di ) = K } be the set of uncon-
cerned individuals and Nx (D) = |{i ∈ I (D) : x ∈ G(Di )}| be the concerned support
for x at D.
A social choice function f : R¯N → 2K \{∅} selects for all preference profiles
R ∈ R¯N a non-empty set of alternatives f (R). Any social choice function belonging
to the class of scoring rules can be represented by a vector s = (s0, s1, . . . , sk−1) ∈ Rk
satisfying the conditions s j−1 ≤ s j for all j = 1, ..., k−1 and s0 < sk−1. The range of
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s is normalized by assuming that s0 = 0 and sk−1 = k − 1. Scoring rules are typically
applied on the domain of strict preferences P . In this case, points are assigned to every
alternative in such a way that if alternative x is in the j’th top position according to
Pi , then x receives psx (Pi ) = sk− j points from individual i . Given a strict preference
profile P ∈ P N and an alternative x ∈ K , let psx (P) =
∑n
i=1 psx (Pi ) be the score
of alternative x at P when scoring rule s is applied. Then, society selects for a given
strict preference profile the set of alternatives with the highest score.
However, if preferences are not strict, then the point assignment process has to
be generalized. If we aim to study extensions which are neutral (if an individual
is indifferent between two alternatives, both alternative receive the same amount of
points from that individual), maintain the total amount of points constant for every
preference relation, and assign to an alternative the same amount of points when-
ever its relative position with respect to two preference relation is identical, then
we have to do it as follows (see Sect. 4 for a formal proof): Given the preference
relation Ri ∈ R¯ that consists of c(Ri ) indifference classes, 1 ≤ c(Ri ) ≤ k, let
Cm(Ri ) be the set of alternatives belonging to the m’th top indifference class of
Ri . The cardinality of Cm(Ri ) is cm(Ri ). Moreover, denote by Qm(Ri ) the union
of the top m indifference classes of Ri ; that is, Qm(Ri ) = ⋃mj=1 C j (Ri ). The
corresponding cardinality is qm(Ri ). Then, for all m, 1 ≤ m ≤ c(Ri ), all alternatives
x ∈ Cm(Ri ) receive psx (Ri ) = 1cm(Ri )
∑cm(Ri )
j=1 s(k−qm−1(Ri )− j) points from individ-
ual i when scoring rule s is applied. This approach is the obvious and natural one of
using the average of the relevant scores. Given the preference profile R ∈ R¯N and
alternative x ∈ K , let psx (R) =
∑n
i=1 psx (Ri ) be the score of alternative x at R
under s.
Definition 1 The social choice function fs : R¯N → 2K \{∅} associated with the
scoring rule s is such that for all R ∈ R¯N , x ∈ f (R) if and only if psx (R) ≥ psy(R)
for all y ∈ K .
The Borda Count fB is given by s j = j for all j = 0, ..., k −1. With a slight abuse
of notation by dropping the superscript s we write px (Ri ) and px (R) whenever the
Borda Count is applied. Finally, we provide some intuition for the generalized point
assignment process corresponding to the Borda Count: Given Ri ∈ R¯, compare alter-
native x with every alternative y ∈ K\{x}. If x Pi y, then assign one point to x and zero
points to y (give the point to y whenever y Pi x). If x Ii y, then split the point equally.
The sum of points alternative x obtains after performing all pair-wise comparisons is
equal to px (Ri ).
Approval Voting is one of the most prominent voting rules both in theory and
practice. It endows individuals with the right to vote for not just one but for as many
alternatives as they wish to and, given the votes from all individuals, the set of all alter-
natives with the highest number of votes is selected: that is, the mapping Mi : R¯ → 2K
determines for all preference relations Ri ∈ R¯ the set of alternatives Mi (Ri ) ∈ 2K indi-
vidual i votes for and the Approval Voting function v : (2K )N → 2K \{∅} aggregates
the individual voting decisions by selecting the alternatives with the highest number of




, x ∈ v (M1(R1), . . . , Mn(Rn))
if and only if |{i ∈ N : x ∈ Mi (Ri )}| ≥ |{i ∈ N : y ∈ Mi (Ri )}| for all y ∈ K .
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Regenwetter and Tsetlin (2004) discuss different probabilistic models that make
assumptions on how the mappings (Mi )i∈N look like in order to compare Approval
Voting in expected terms to social choice functions. But for the case of dichotomous
preferences the natural interpretation of the mappings Mi : D → 2K is such that for
all i ∈ N and all Di ∈ D, Mi (Di ) = G(Di ).1 Thus, we are able to define Approval
Voting as a social choice function.
Definition 2 The social choice function f : DN → 2K \{∅} is Approval Voting if for
all D ∈ DN , x ∈ f (D) if and only if Nx (D) ≥ Ny(D) for all y ∈ K .
The social choice function corresponding to Approval Voting is denoted by f A. A
transition of Approval Voting to social choice functions does not exist any more if pref-
erences are richer, because, given Mi (Ri ) for a particular preference relation Ri ∈ R¯
that consists of at least three indifference classes, it is impossible to recover prefer-
ences fully. To see this let the preference relation Pi ∈ P be such that x Pi y Pi z. In this
case, we cannot infer from Mi (Pi ) = {x, y} that x Pi y. Similarly, if Mi (Pi ) = {x},
then we cannot deduce that y Pi z.
3 Results
The dichotomous preference domain is well suited for comparing Approval Voting and
scoring rules, because it is the largest domain for which Approval Voting constitutes
a well-defined social choice function (in the sense that it is possible to recover prefer-
ences fully from votes). Claim 1 states that, given a preference relation, the difference
in points between a good and a bad alternative is constant whenever the Borda Count
is applied. In particular, the difference does not depend on the size of the set of good
alternatives.
Claim 1 If Di ∈ D satisfies x Pi y, then px (Di ) − py(Di ) = k2 .
Proof Let the scoring rule s be equal to the Borda Count and consider the prefer-
ence relation Di ∈ D which is such that x Pi y. From the equation ∑nj=1 j = n(n+1)2




g(Di )k−∑g(Di )j=1 j
g(Di ) =
2g(Di )k−g(Di )(g(Di )+1)
2g(Di ) =
2k−g(Di )−1
2 points from individual i . Observe that
k − g(Di ) = b(Di ), because Di ∈ D belongs to a concerned individual. Therefore,
i assigns py(Di ) =
∑b(Di )
j=1 k−g(Di )− j
b(Di ) =
b(Di )(k−g(Di ))−∑b(Di )j=1 j
b(Di ) =
2b(Di )(k−g(Di ))−b(Di )(b(Di )+1)
2b(Di ) =
k−g(Di )−1
2 points to alternative y. We conclude that
px (Di ) − py(Di ) = k2 . unionsq
It follows immediately that the score of an alternative according to the Borda Count
is an affine transformation of the number of concerned individuals who approve it.
1 An individual that votes for all alternatives or none at all reveals to be unconcerned. Since the effect of
both strategies is the same under Approval Voting, there is no loss of generality by setting Mi (Di ) = K .
The alternative would be to let Mi (Di ) be equal to K\B(Di ).
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Said differently, the Borda Count is equivalent to Approval Voting on the dichotomous
preference domain.
Proposition 1 For all D ∈ DN , fB(D) = f A(D).
Proof Let the scoring s be equal to the Borda Count. Given the preference profile D ∈




2 + k−12 · |I (D)|
by Claim 1. We conclude that the difference in the score of x and y is equal to
px (D) − py(D) = k2 (Nx (D) − Ny(D)). It follows that for all D ∈ DN , Nx (D) ≥
Ny(D) for all y ∈ K if and only if px (D) ≥ py(D) for all y ∈ K . unionsq
One aim of the literature on social choice theory is to study normative properties
of aggregation procedures. Special attention should be given to strategy-proof social
choice functions, because they assure that individuals have incentives to represent their
preferences truthfully, or, to say it differently, all room for individual strategic behavior
is eliminated. So far, we cannot define strategy-proofness properly, because the image
of a social choice function is set-valued but preferences are defined on alternatives.
One way how to deal with this problem is to extend preferences. In particular, we
assume that the reflexive, complete, and transitive preference relation Ri defined on
2K \{∅} satisfies the subsequent properties proposed by Brams and Fishburn (1978):
1. Condition P: {x} Ri {x, y} Ri {y} if and only if x Pi y.
2. Condition R: For all S, T ⊆ 2K \{∅}, if S ⊆ G(Ri ) or T ⊆ B(Ri ) or [S\T ⊆
G(Ri ) and T \S ⊆ B(Ri )], then S Ri T .2
One preference extension that satisfies condition P and R for dichotomous prefer-
ences is expected utility maximization (an individual cares about the proportion of
good alternatives selected), the case for which Bogomolnaia et al. (2005) obtain a
series of impossibility results. Now, we can define strategy-proofness in a straightfor-
ward way. The social choice function f : R¯N → 2K \{∅} is manipulable by i on R¯N
if for some R ∈ R¯N and R′i ∈ R¯, f (R′i , R−i ) Ri f (R).
Definition 3 The social choice function f : R¯N → 2K \{∅} is strategy-proof on R¯ if
it is not manipulable by any individual on R¯N .
Approval Voting is strategy-proof on the dichotomous preference domain due to
Brams and Fishburn (1978). The proof that any scoring rule different from the Borda
Count is manipulable on this domain whenever at least three individuals participate
in the election is based on the observation that for other scoring rules, the difference
in points between a good and a bad alternative depends on the size of the set of good
alternatives.
2 Condition R implies that adding a good (bad) alternative to a set of alternatives containing only good
(bad) alternatives leaves individuals indifferent, whereas individuals would be strictly better (worse) off
according to the separable preferences studied by Barberà et al. (1991). This difference stems from the fact
that the latter authors emphasize situations where alternatives are compatible, here we interpret the image
of a social choice function as the set of pre-selected alternatives from which a unique alternative will be
selected afterwards.
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Claim 2 Suppose Dti ∈ D is such that x Pi y and g(Dti ) = t , 0 < t < k. Only the
Borda Count satisfies psx (Dti ) − psy(Dti ) = c for all t .
Proof Let the preference relation Dti ∈ D be such that x Pi y and g(Dti ) = t , 0 < t < k,
and suppose that there exists a scoring rule s different from the Borda Count for which
psx (Dti ) − psy(Dti ) = c for all t . Let T be the total amount of points assigned by the
scoring rule s. Considering t = 1, we have that psx (D1i )− psy(D1i ) = k−1− T −(k−1)k−1 =
k − Tk−1 . Similarly, if t = k − 1, then psx (Dk−1i ) − psy(Dk−1i ) = Tk−1 − 0. Since both
numbers are equal to c by assumption, k − Tk−1 = Tk−1 or T = k(k−1)2 . Since t can
take k − 1 different values, we conclude that c = k2 .
Finally, we prove by induction that c = k2 implies necessarily s j = j for all
j = 1, ..., k − 2. We know that px (Dk−1−1i ) − py(Dk−1−1i ) = T −s1k−2 − s12 = k2 .
This equation is equivalent to s1 = 1. Let q ≥ 2 and suppose that for all q¯ < q,
px (D
k−1−q¯






!= k2 implies sq¯ = q¯ . We have
to show that this statement is also true for q. Observe that the difference in points,
px (D
k−1−q






q+1 due to the induc-




(q + 1) − k · q(q−1)2 − k · sq = k2 (k − 1 − q)(q + 1). The result sq = q
follows from simple algebra. unionsq
Proposition 2 Suppose that n ≥ 3. The social choice function fs : DN → 2K \ {∅}
corresponding to the scoring rule s is strategy-proof if and only if it is the Borda Count.
Proof The Borda Count is strategy-proof on the dichotomous preference domain
according to Brams and Fishburn (1978) and Proposition 1. To show that any scoring
rule s different from the Borda Count is manipulable on this preference domain,
note that by Claim 2 there are two preference relations D1i , D
t
i ∈ D, satisfying
G(D1i ) = {x}, x ∈ G(Dti ), y ∈ G(Dti ) and g(Dti ) = t , 1 < t < k, such that
psx (D1i ) − psy(D1i ) = psx (Dti ) − psy(Dti ).
Let K = {x, y, z1, ..., zk−2} and consider the following profile (D1i , D−i ) ∈ DN :
G(D1i ) = {x}, G(D j ) = {y} and G(Dl) = {x, y} for all l = i, j . In this case,
fs(D1i , D−i ) = {x, y} because n ≥ 3. Let Dti ∈ D correspond to set of good alter-
natives G(Dti ) = {x, z1, ..., zt−1}. If psx (D1i ) − psy(D1i ) > psx (Dti ) − psy(Dti ), then
fs(Dti , D−i ) = {y} and individual i can manipulate fs at (Dti , D−i ) ∈ DN via D1i .
If psx (D1i ) − psy(D1i ) < psx (Dti ) − psy(Dti ), then fs(Dti , D−i ) = {x} and individual i
can manipulate fs at (D1i , D−i ) ∈ DN via Dti . unionsq
The results are mixed for n = 2. To see this suppose that K = {x, y, z} and let the
preference profile (D1, D2) be such that G(D1) = {x, z} and G(D2) = {y}. For this
preference profile we find that fs(D) = {y} whenever s1 < 1. If D′1 is the preference
relation corresponding to G(D′1) = {x}, then fs(D′1, D2) = {x, y}. Since individual
1 with the preference relation D1 strictly prefers {x, y} to {y} according to condition
P, we have found a viable manipulation whenever s1 < 1. On the other hand, one
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can show by means of straightforward calculus that any scoring rule corresponding
to the values s1 ≥ 1 is strategy-proof on the dichotomous preference domain for
some reflexive, complete, and transitive preference extension satisfying condition P
and condition R. One example is the situation when individuals are expected utility
maximizers.
Next, we analyze whether the domain restriction can be weakened. That is, are there
domains containing the set of dichotomous preferences under which the Borda Count
is strategy-proof? Following Ching and Serizawa (1998), the domain R¯ ⊆ R is a max-
imal domain for a list of properties for the social choice function f : R¯N → 2K \{∅}
if (a) f : R¯N → 2K \{∅} satisfies the list of properties, and (b) for all R˜  R¯,
f : R˜N → 2K \{∅} does not satisfy the list of properties. In addition to strategy-
proofness we consider a richness condition that eliminates all small domains for which
the Borda Count is strategy-proof. The condition we apply is stronger than the one
of Berga and Serizawa (2000) who propose that the domain R¯ ⊆ R is rich if for all
x ∈ K there exists a preference relation Ri ∈ R¯ such that x Pi y for all y ∈ K\{x}.
Here, the domain R¯ ⊆ R is rich if for all x ∈ K there exists a dichotomous preference
relation Di ∈ R¯ such that G(Di ) = {x}.
Claim 3 If the preference relation Ri ∈ R¯ is such that c(Ri ) ≥ 3, x ∈ G(Ri ) and
y ∈ B(Ri ), then px (Ri ) − py(Ri ) > k2 .
Proof Let the preference relation Ri ∈ R¯ be such that c(Ri ) ≥ 3, x ∈ G(Ri ) and
y ∈ B(Ri ). We have that px (Ri )− py(Ri ) = 1g(Ri )
∑g(Ri )
j=1 (k− j)− 1b(Ri )
∑b(Ri )−1
j=1 j is
strictly greater than 1g(Ri )
∑g(Ri )
j=1 (k − j)− 1b(Ri )
∑k−g(Ri )−1
j=1 j because c(Ri ) ≥ 3 im-
plies k−g(Ri ) > b(Ri ). Consider the dichotomous preference relation D′i ∈ D which
is such that x P ′i y and g(D′i ) = g(Ri ). Then, px (D′i ) − py(D′i ) = 1g(Ri )
∑g(Ri )
j=1 (k −
j) − 1b(Ri )
∑k−g(Ri )−1
j=1 j . Since this difference is equal to k2 by Claim 1, we conclude
that px (Ri ) − py(Ri ) > k2 . unionsq
Proposition 3 The dichotomous preference domain is a maximal domain for strat-
egy-proofness for the Borda Count whenever n ≥ 3. If n > 3, then it is the unique
maximal one.
Proof It is obvious that the dichotomous preference domain is rich. Moreover, the
Borda Count is strategy-proof on D according to Brams and Fishburn (1978) and
Proposition 1. To construct a viable manipulation, consider the preference relation
Ri ∈ R¯ which is such that c(Ri ) ≥ 3, x ∈ G(Ri ) and y ∈ B(Ri ).
If n is even, then let the preference profile D ∈ DN be such that G(Di ) = {x}
for all i ≤ n2 and G(Di ) = {y} for all i > n2 . If n is odd, then the preference profile
D ∈ DN satisfies G(Di ) = {x} for all i ≤ n−12 , G(Di ) = {y} for all n−12 < i < n −1
and G(Dn) = {z} for some z = x, y. We have that fB(D) = {x, y} if n > 3. More-
over, fB(R1, D−1) = {x} by Claim 1 and 3. Thus, individual 1 can manipulate the
Borda Count at D ∈ DN via Ri if n > 3. Since the preferences used to construct the
manipulation belong to any rich domain different from D, we have shown maximality
and uniqueness simultaneously whenever n > 3. Uniqueness can not be proved for
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the case n = 3, but we are able to obtain maximality by considering the preference
profile D ∈ DN which is such that G(D1) = {x}, G(D2) = {y} and G(D3) = {x, y}.
In this case, individual 1 can manipulate the Borda Count at D ∈ DN via Ri , because
fB(D) = {x, y} and fB(R1, D−1) = {x} by Claim 1 and 3. unionsq
Consider the following example to see why there is another maximal rich domain
for strategy-proofness for the Borda Count if the number of individuals is equal to
three.
Example 1 Suppose that n = 3 and K = {x, y, z}. Let the preference domain
R¯ = {Di , D j , Dl , Ri } be completely prescribed by the sets G(Di ) = {x}, G(D j ) =
{y}, G(Dl) = {z}, G(Ri ) = {x}, and B(Ri ) = {z}. Note that the domain R¯ is rich. If
the preference profile R ∈ R¯ is such that two individuals have the same preference
relation Dm , m = i, j, l, or one individual has the preference relation Di and a second
individual has the preference relation Ri , then the Borda Count selects the top alterna-
tive according to Dm or alternative x , respectively. We can see that at these preference
profiles the top alternative of two individuals is chosen. Since the third individual
cannot change this by misrepresenting her/his preferences, there are only two possible
manipulations: Individual i either manipulates the Borda Count at (Di , D j , Dl) ∈ R¯N
via Ri ∈ R¯ or she/he manipulates the Borda Count at (Ri , D j , Dl) ∈ R¯N via Di ∈ R¯.
Observe that fB(Di , D j , Dl) = K and fB(Ri , D j , Dl) = {y}. If individual i with
the preference relation Di , or Ri respectively, is indifferent between {y} and {x, y, z}
(this does not contradict neither condition P nor condition R), then the Borda Count
is strategy-proof on the {Di , D j , Dl , Ri } domain.
Finally, Propositions 2 and 3 together imply the following Theorem.
Theorem 1 The dichotomous preference domain is a maximal rich domain where
strategy-proof scoring-rules exist.
4 An axiomatic generalization of scoring rules
To our best knowledge, the only existing definition of scoring rules that is applicable
on weak preference domains is due Myerson (1996). Following his approach the so-
cial choice function f is a scoring rule if there exists a set of functions {Sx : R¯ →




Ri ∈R¯ Sy(Ri ) · N (Ri ; R), where N (Ri ; R) denotes the number of indi-
viduals with preference relation Ri given profile R.3 Since the definition of scoring
rules we propose is very intuitive but more restrictive, we would like to support it by
means of an axiomatic analysis. To this end, we do not aim at characterizing our class
of scoring rules from the set of all social choice functions, rather we want to know
how a given scoring rule for strict preferences should be extended to weak preference
3 In fact, Myerson’s definition of a social choice function is slightly more complicated than the one used
in this paper, because it also accounts for a variable set of individuals.
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domains.4 Formally, let p˜sx (Ri ) be the amount of points individual i with preference
relation Ri ∈ R¯ assigns to alternative x if s is applied on P . We want ( p˜sx (Ri ))x∈K to
satisfy the following properties.
1. Neutrality If Ri ∈ R¯ satisfies x Ii y for some x, y ∈ K , p˜sx (Ri ) = p˜sy(Ri ).
2. Total Points For all Ri ∈ R¯,∑x∈K p˜sx (Ri ) =
∑k−1
j=1 s j .
3. Independence For all Ri , R′i ∈ R¯ which are such that for some x ∈ K , {y ∈
K : x Ri y} = {y ∈ K : x R′i y} and {y ∈ K : y Ri x} = {y ∈ K : y R′i x},
p˜sx (Ri ) = p˜sx (R′i ).
Usually, scoring rules are considered to be neutral in the sense that if the set of alter-
natives is permuted for a given preference profile, then set of elected alternatives has
to be permuted accordingly. Here, neutrality means that no individual discriminates
between two alternatives whenever she/he is indifferent between them. Total points
states that any individual distributes the same total amount of points irrespective of
her/his preferences. And finally, according to independence an alternative which is
in the same relative position with respect to two preference relations gets the same
amount of points.
Proposition 4 Suppose that the scoring rule s is applied on P . Given Ri ∈ R¯,
( p˜sx (Ri ))x∈K satisfies neutrality, total points, and independence if and only if for
all indifference classes Cm(Ri ), 1 ≤ m ≤ c(Ri ), and all alternatives y ∈ Cm(Ri ),
p˜sy(Ri ) = psy(Ri ).
Proof Given the scoring rule s for strict preference domains and the preference rela-
tion Ri ∈ R¯, it is easy to see that psx (Ri ) satisfies the three properties. Suppose
now that p˜sx (Ri ) satisfies neutrality, total points, and independence. We prove that for
all indifference classes Cm(Ri ), 1 ≤ m ≤ c(Ri ), and all alternatives x ∈ Cm(Ri ),
p˜sx (Ri ) = psx (Ri ).
Consider any arbitrary indifference class Cm(Ri ). Take any preference relation
R′i ∈ R¯ such that for all x, y ∈ Cm(Ri ) and all w, z ∈ Cm(Ri ), x I ′i y, either wP ′i z or
z P ′i w, and x R′i z if and only x Ri z (this preference relation breaks all possibly existing
ties outside Cm(Ri ) maintaining the relative ordering for all alternatives in Cm(Ri )
the same). By independence,
p˜sx (R
′
i ) = p˜sx (Ri ) for all x ∈ Cm(Ri ). (1)
Take any strict preference relation P ′′i ∈ P which is such that for all x, y ∈ K , if
x P ′i y then x P ′′i y (this preference relation breaks all ties within Cm(R′i ) in an arbitrary
4 For weak preference domains Myerson’s (1996) main result can be stated as follows: a social choice
function (with a variable set of individuals) satisfies reinforcement, overwhelming majority, and neutrality
if and only if it is a scoring rule (in his sense). Reinforcement asks that if two disjoint groups of individuals
elect some common alternatives, then exactly this set has to be elected whenever all individuals within the
two groups and no individual outside the two groups participates in the election. Overwhelming majority
requires that for any two preference profiles, there exists a natural number n such that at an election consist-
ing of at least n times the first preference profile plus the second preference profile, a subset of the image
at the first preference profile is elected. Finally, neutrality states that if the set of alternatives is permuted
for a given preference profile, then set of elected alternatives has to be permuted accordingly. This result is
clearly unrelated to our characterization.
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way). By construction of P ′′i ∈ P and the assumption that the scoring rule s is applied
for strict preferences,
∑
x ∈Cm (Ri ) p˜
s
x (P ′′i ) =
∑k−1
j=1 sk− j −
∑cm(Ri )
j=1 s(k−qm−1(Ri )− j).
Since, additionally, for all x ∈ Cm(Ri ), p˜sx (R′i ) = p˜sx (P ′′i ) by independence and∑
x∈K p˜sx (R′i ) =
∑
x∈K p˜sx (P ′′i ) =
∑k−1
j=1 sk− j by total points, we conclude that∑
x∈Cm (Ri ) p˜
s
x (R′i ) =
∑cm(Ri )
j=1 s(k−qm−1(Ri )− j). Hence, by Eq. (1),
∑
x∈Cm (Ri )
p˜sx (Ri ) =
cm (Ri )∑
j=1
s(k−qm−1(Ri )− j). (2)
The result follows from Eq. (2) and neutrality. unionsq
This characterization is tight as the following three examples show.
Neutrality Take alternatives x and y as given. Now, let ( p˜sz(Ri ))z∈K be such that
for all preference relations Ri ∈ R¯ which satisfy x Ii y and x Pi z for all z = y,
p˜sx (Ri ) = sk−1 + sk−2, p˜sy(Ri ) = 0, and p˜sz(Ri ) = psz(Ri ) for all z ∈ {x, y}. For
all other preference relations R′i ∈ R¯, p˜sz(R′i ) = psz (R′i ) for all z ∈ K . Observe that
(psz(Ri ))z∈K satisfies total points and independence. The following example shows
that it does not satisfy neutrality. Let K = {w, x, y} and consider the preference
relation Ri ∈ R¯ such that x Ii y Piw. Since p˜sx (Ri ) = sk−1 + sk−2 and p˜sy(Ri ) = 0,
( p˜sz(Ri ))z∈K does not satisfy neutrality.
Total points Take alternatives x and y as given. Now, let ( p˜sz(Ri ))z∈K be such that
for all preference relations Ri ∈ R¯ which satisfy x Ii y and x Pi z for all z = y,
p˜sx (Ri ) = p˜sy(Ri ) = sk−1 + 1 and p˜sz(Ri ) = psz(Ri ) for all z ∈ {x, y}. For all
other preference relations R′i ∈ R¯, p˜sz(R′i ) = psz(R′i ) for all z ∈ K . Observe that
(psz(Ri ))z∈K satisfies neutrality and independence. The following example shows that
it does not satisfy total points. Let K = {w, x, y} and consider the preference rela-
tion Ri ∈ R¯ such that x Ii y Piw. Since ∑z∈K p˜sz(Ri ) = 2sk−1 + 2 > sk−1 + sk−2,
( p˜sz(Ri ))z∈K does not satisfy total points.
Independence Take alternative x as given. Now, let ( p˜sz(Ri ))z∈K be such that for
all preference relations Ri ∈ R¯ which satisfy x Pi y for all y = x and y Ii z for some
y, z = x, p˜sx (Ri ) = sk−1 + 1, p˜sy(Ri ) = psy(Ri ) − 1c2(Ri ) for all y ∈ C2(Ri ),
and p˜sz(Ri ) = psz (Ri ) for all z ∈ {C2(Ri ) ∪ {x}}. For all other preference relations
R′i ∈ R¯, p˜sz(R′i ) = psz(R′i ) for all z ∈ K . Observe that (psz(Ri ))z∈K satisfies neutrality
and total points. The following example shows that it does not satisfy independence.
Let K = {w, x, y} and consider the preference relation Ri ∈ R¯ such that x Pi y Iiw.
Then, p˜sx (Ri ) = sk−1 + 1. On the other hand, if R′i ∈ R¯ satisfies x P ′i y P ′i w, then
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